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Dogs have a unique capacity to follow human pointing, and thus it is often assumed that they can
comprehend the referential meaning of such signals. However, it is still unclear whether dogs perceive
human directional gestures as signals referring to a target object (indicating what to manipulate) or a
spatial cue (indicating where to do something). In the present study, we investigated which of these
alternative interpretations may explain dogs’ responses to human pointing gestures in ostensive com-
municative and nonostensive cuing contexts. To test whether dogs select the cued object or the cued
location, subjects were presented with 2 alternative object-choice trials. An experimenter first attracted
the attention of the dog either by calling the dog’s name and looking at it (ostensive condition, n  24)
or by clapping the hands (nonostensive condition, n  24) then pointed at 1 of 2 different toy objects.
Subsequently, the experimenter switched the location of the 2 target objects in full view of the dogs by
grasping the objects and making a 180° turn. Dogs were then allowed to choose between the 2 objects.
In the ostensive condition, dogs showed a significant bias toward the cued location compared with the
nonostensive condition in which they performed at chance. These results suggest that pointing refers to
a direction or location for dogs, but only if they are addressed with ostensive cues that indicate the
communicative intention of the signaler.
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Use of referential communication has long been thought to be
unique to humans (e.g., Darwin, 1872). However, decades of
extensive research has revealed that some other species, including
mammals (e.g., bottlenose dolphins: King & Janik, 2013; chim-
panzees: Slocombe & Zuberbühler, 2005) and birds (e.g., ravens:
Bugnyar, Kijne, & Kotrschal, 2001) can also produce and respond
adequately to a limited set of referential vocal signals that indicate
specific objects or events in the environment (Liebal, Waller,
Slocombe, & Burrows, 2013). It remains, however, an open ques-
tion whether these signals are information-based in the sense that
they reduce uncertainty in the receiver (Carazo & Font, 2010). In
fact, production of these signals is context-specific (a specific
contextual cue triggers them), and the response to them is
stimulus-independent (might occur in the absence of the referent as
well), thus, these signals have been described as “functionally
referential” to differentiate them from the referential signals pro-
duced by humans (Wheeler & Fischer, 2012). Importantly, some
nonhuman species can also understand referential cues that are not
context-specific, namely, directional gestures such as pointing or
gazing. For instance, elephants (Smet & Byrne, 2013), seals
(Scheumann & Call, 2004), and dolphins (Herman et al., 1999) can
rely on human pointing in an object choice task, even though
pointing is not part of their own signal repertoire, while ravens
(Pika & Bugnyar, 2011) and fish (Plectropomus pessuliferus
marisrubi and Plectropomus leopardus: Vail, Manica, & Bshary,
2013) can produce specific referential gestures and can also ade-
quately respond to them.
Responsiveness to human directional gestures has also been inves-
tigated in domesticated species, for example, in cats (Miklósi, Pon-
grácz, Lakatos, Topál, & Csányi, 2005), horses (Proops, Walton, &
McComb, 2010), and ferrets (Hernádi, Kis, Turcsán, & Topál, 2012).
These skills have been most extensively studied in dogs (e.g., Wobber
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& Kaminski, 2011), whose social and communicative abilities show
some overlap with those of humans (Bräuer, Kaminski, Riedel, Call,
& Tomasello, 2006). Previous findings have suggested that dogs can
rely on various types of human directional gestures, such as different
types of pointing gestures in an object choice task where at least one
limb of the signaler protruded from the body contour (Soproni,
Miklósi, Topál, & Csányi, 2002). Dogs’ performance in these tasks is
comparable to that of 2-year-old children (Lakatos, Soproni, Dóka, &
Miklósi, 2009), and, importantly, it seems that, like infants (see
Csibra, 2010), dogs rely on ostensive cues such as eye contact or
high-pitched speech to recognize when a referential gesture is being
addressed to them (Kaminski, Schulz, & Tomasello, 2012). Both
human infants (Behne, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2005) and dogs
(Kaminski et al., 2012; Tauzin, Csík, Kis, Kovács, & Topál, 2015) are
better at following human pointing if the directional gesture is pre-
ceded by ostensive signals that indicate a person’s communicative
intention.
This striking analogy in observable behavior, however, does not
imply that the “meaning” of pointing is the same for both species.
Referential pointing might have a different range of functions in
human infants than in dogs, because pointing can be performed and
interpreted as a declarative, interrogative, or imperative gesture. De-
clarative pointing is produced by infants to indicate an event or object
of interest in the environment (Liszkowski, Carpenter, Henning,
Striano, & Tomasello, 2004) in order to share attention and experi-
ence with someone else (Tomasello & Carpenter, 2007), while inter-
rogative pointing is an epistemic request toward a knowledgeable
person about the referent (Kovács, Tauzin, Téglás, Gergely, & Csibra,
2014). In contrast, an imperative pointing gesture would mean that the
signaler requests an action on a specific referent at a particular
location (Bates, Camaioni, & Volterra, 1975). Dogs’ response to
human pointing could reflect an imperative interpretation of pointing
(Kaminski et al., 2012; Szetei, Miklósi, Topál, & Csányi, 2003),
however, it is also possible that dogs interpret pointing as simply
providing useful information about the referent (Scheider, Kaminski,
Call, & Tomasello, 2013).
What seems common in these different explanations is that,
regardless of its function, the understanding of pointing implies
integration of signal and context to infer what was pointed at
(Wheeler & Fischer, 2012), because pointing does not have a fixed
referent (Liebal et al., 2013). It has been found that even 9-month-
old human infants interpret ostensive pointing as referring to a
target object and not as a signal indicating a specific location
(Yoon, Johnson, & Csibra, 2008). It seems that for humans com-
municative pointing carries information about the target object (by
focusing the observer’s attention on the object’s properties) and
not about the location of the designated object. Although dogs and
human infants readily grasp the informing feature of human point-
ing, it is still unclear whether dogs, like infants, perceive pointing
as a signal referring to a target object or as referring to a location
indicating where to go.
To investigate this question, we designed an object choice
paradigm where after a human pointed at one of two clearly
different target objects, the location of the objects were switched in
full view of the dog. We hypothesized that if, for dogs, the identity
of the referent object is more relevant than its location, dogs would
select the cued object at the new location. However, if dogs
perceive pointing as a signal referring to a certain location, they
would select the nonindicated object at the cued location. We also
tested whether the communicative context of pointing affected
dogs’ responses. Therefore, dogs were presented with human
pointing gestures either in an ostensive (calling the dog’s name and
making eye contact with the dog) or in a nonostensive (clapping of
hands without eye contact) condition.
Method
Participants
Fifty-nine toy-motivated pet dogs (ostensive condition: n  30;
15 males; Mage  3.63 years, SD  2.43; 11 mix breeds and 19
purebreds from 13 different breeds; nonostensive condition: n 
29; 14 males; Mage  4.38 years, SD 2.53; eight mix breeds and
21 purebreds from 14 different breeds) were recruited from the
Family Dog Project database of the Department of Ethology,
Eötvös Loránd University. We excluded 11 dogs (six from the
ostensive and five from the nonostensive condition). Four dogs
were excluded due to a constant side bias (i.e., selecting the same
side in each trial) because the behavior of these dogs was assumed
to be independent of the pointing of the experimenter, thus dogs’
choice behavior could not be informative regarding our experi-
mental question (how dogs interpret pointing). Another seven dogs
were excluded because at least half of their test trials were invalid
due to either the influence of the owner, experimenter error, or
failure to search. All exclusions were based on a priori criteria after
the offline coding of dog behavior but before completion of data
collection, except for in the case of one dog showing in-test
anxiety where testing concluded after 6 trials. There were 48 dogs
in the final sample, 24 dogs in the ostensive condition (12 males;
Mage  3.7 years, SD  2.56; 10 mix breeds and 14 purebreds
from 11 different breeds) and 24 dogs in the nonostensive condi-
tion (11 males; Mage  4.87, SD  2.44; 6 mix breeds and 18
purebreds from 13 different breeds).
Procedure
Before starting the experiment, the owner led the dog to the
experimental room (3.0  5.0 m) and let it explore freely for 3
min. The owner then sat down at a predetermined point holding the
dog by its collar facing Experimenter 1 (E1) who stood at the
midline of the testing room, approximately 2 m from the dog.
Experimenter 2 (E2) stood next to the dog.
Ostensive Condition
The experiment consisted of eight trials organized into four sepa-
rate blocks. In the first block, E1 put two distinct, 18-cm tall plush
toys on the ground in reaching distance (approximately 75 cm) to the
left and right of E1. The plush toys were presented in pairs, either a
brown kangaroo with a whiteyellow pig or a yellowred bear with
a beige rabbit, none of which the dog had seen before the experiment.
The dog was prevented from witnessing the placement of the toys by
E2 who placed a dark blue plastic occluder (1 0.75 m) between the
dog and E1. After the plush toys were placed, E1 took the initial
position in which he stood equidistant between the two target objects,
bent his arms in front of his torso, contacted his elbows and wrists
with closed fists, lowering his head and looking at the ground (see
Figure 1). After E2 removed the occluder, E1 looked at the dog and
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called its name (“Look, [dog’s name]!”). When the dog looked at his
face, E1 pointed at the target object (1 s momentary pointing) while
also turning his head and looking at the toy. After the point, E1
assumed his initial position and then crouched down, grasped the two
plush toys, and slowly turned 180° with arms extended to switch the
side of the two toys. E1 stopped turning when his back was to the dog,
and then he simultaneously placed the toys on the ground, stood up,
lowered his arms, and stepped forward (away from the dog). Thus, E1
was facing away from the dog during the choice phase so not to
influence the dog’s behavior. At that moment, the owner was allowed
to release the dog, prompting it verbally (e.g. “You may go!” or
“Fetch it!”), but without using any gestures to direct the dog. After the
dog selected a toy (see Data Analysis section), E1 picked up the
nonchosen object. Then, or if the dog did not approach one of the
plush toys within 20 s, the owner called the dog back. The second trial
followed the same procedure, except that the target object’s initial
position, and therefore the direction of pointing, was opposite that
used in the first trial.
In the second block, the owner was instructed to lead the dog to
the opposite side of the room, sit down, and face the dog toward
the initial location. This was done to avoid an allocentric side bias.
E1 then used the second pair of plush toys to prevent the emer-
gence of a constant preference for one of the plush toys. The order
of left/right pointing in the second block was the same as in the
first. The third and the fourth blocks were exactly the same as the
first and the second blocks, respectively. The direction of the first
point and the plush toy that was pointed at first were counterbal-
anced between subjects.
Nonostensive Condition
The procedure in the nonostensive condition was exactly the
same as that of the ostensive condition, except that E1 wore black
sunglasses and avoided looking at or talking to the dog. Thus, E1
looked at the ground with lowered head when he called the dog’s
attention and he used nonverbal signals (clapping the hands)
instead of calling the subject by name.
Data Collection and Analysis
Test events were recorded and videos were analyzed offline. A
choice was coded if the dog approached a toy object within 0.5 m
with his nose. A second coder scored 50% of the dogs in both
conditions (n  24 subjects in total). Interrater reliability was
almost perfect (Cohen’s   0.98).
To examine dogs’ performance, we calculated the average nor-
malized difference score based on the number of approaches to the
cued location versus the cued object for each dog (thus, 0 repre-
sents chance level on a scale from 1 to 1, positive values
indicating a bias toward the cued side and negative values a bias
toward the cued object). We employed Wilcoxon signed-ranks test
to investigate whether there was a significant difference between
the difference scores and chance level in both conditions. Differ-
ence scores were also compared using a Mann–Whitney test be-
tween the two conditions to see whether ostension had an effect on
dogs’ choice behavior.
Results
Dogs in the ostensive condition selected the cued side more often
than the cued object (Mdifference score 0.23), 95% confidence interval
(CI) [0.09, 0.38]. Their bias toward the cued location was significant
compared with chance level (z  2.614, p  .007, r  .533).
However, in the nonostensive condition, dogs did not have a bias
toward the cued location or the cued object (Mdifference score0.03),
95% CI [0.15, 0.1]. Their performance did not differ significantly
from chance level (z  0.253, p  .834, r  .051). The difference
between the two conditions was significant (z 2.432, p .014, r
.351), showing that in the ostensive condition dogs preferred to
choose the cued location significantly more often than in the nonos-
tensive condition (see Figure 2).
Discussion
The present study investigated two possible “meanings” of human
pointing gestures for dogs. Specifically, we tested whether pointing
Figure 1. Steps of the ostensive (a1d1) and nonostensive (a2d2) cueing procedure. Step 1: ostensive
addressing (looking at the dog and calling the dog’s name) (a1) and getting the dog’s attention by nonostensive
clapping (a2). Step 2: momentary pointing and looking at the target (b1b2). Step 3: 180° turn to switch the
location of the plush toys (c1c2). Step 4: final arrangement of the objects and taking a step forward (d1d2).
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was an object-related signal, which referred to a target object, or
whether it was a direction-related gesture, which indicated a relevant
location or direction. Our results suggest that dogs’ performance is
consistent with the directional interpretation of pointing, because—at
least in the ostensive condition—they selected the cued location
reliably above chance and tended to ignore the cued object. The above
interpretation of pointing is in line with what has been found in apes
(Haun, Call, Janzen, & Levinson, 2006), which exhibit a preference
for place over feature in a spatial memory task. Note, however, that
apes can also use feature-based strategy in food search tasks (Kanngi-
esser & Call, 2010).
The finding that dogs in the nonostensive condition chose ran-
domly reflects that, in the absence of cues to express communi-
cative intent, dogs probably did not treat the experimenter’s point-
ing as relevant to them, as has been found in previous research
(e.g., Kaminski et al., 2012). The direct comparison of the osten-
sive and nonostensive conditions provided further support for this
explanation. In fact, we found a significant difference between
these conditions, suggesting that ostension modulates dogs’ reac-
tions to human pointing gestures, as has been observed in several
other contexts (see Topál, Kis, & Oláh, 2014, for a review).
Together, these results imply that, for dogs, pointing in an osten-
sive context assigns a direction or an area.
The effect of ostensive cues, however, could have different
interpretations. It is possible that dogs have an early sensitivity to,
and innate predisposition for, human ostensive cues. However, it is
also possible that dogs associate their own name and maybe other
ostensive communicative cues with significant (mainly positive)
consequences during ontogeny (see, e.g., Elgier, Jakovcevic, Bar-
rera, Mustaca, & Bentosela, 2009, for a review of the learning
effect in doghuman communication). This would imply that
ostensive signals are more salient to dogs than nonostensive atten-
tion getters and that this difference is learned. In other words,
interpretation of human ostensive communicative signals could be
grounded within the context of the previously experienced conse-
quences of these signals. In this respect, dogs’ understanding could
differ from that of human infants because infants can understand
unfamiliar ostensive cues (e.g., shivering) as well, and even these
cues can trigger gaze-following (Szufnarowska, Rohlfing, Fawcett,
& Gredebäck, 2014).
Moreover, one might argue that the clapping of hands in the
nonostensive condition distracted or even frightened dogs in the
present study. However, a recent study has suggested that dogs
perceive the clapping of hands that precedes pointing as an atten-
tion getter, and it can even enhance their performance in an object
choice task (Tauzin et al., 2015). However, this result does not rule
out the possibility that there might be a difference between the
attention-getting properties of verbal addressing and clapping.
One could also argue that, in the present experiment, dogs were
misled by the 180° turn where the location of the objects was switched
because, in some previous studies, dogs have had difficulties under-
standing a similar rotation. For instance, Miller, Gipson, Vaughan,
Rayburn-Reeves, and Zentall (2009) reported that dogs were unable
to find a hidden object in a container at either end of a beam when the
container was moved from the left side to the right (or vice versa) by
rotating the beam 180°. In the present study, however, there was no
need for dogs to recall previous scenes because there was no hiding
and the visual features of the target objects were clearly different
(unlike the containers). Moreover, dogs could monitor the actual
location of the objects during the trials.
Thus, there are reasons to assume that dogs were not simply
misled by the 180° turning, rather that they were driven by the
pointing cue. However, in contrast to human infants, who, in an
ostensive context, preferentially encode the features of objects at
the expense of encoding their locations (Yoon et al., 2008), dogs
followed the direction of the ostensive pointing disregarding to
which object the experimenter pointed. This suggests that, al-
though there are some similarities between the two species at the
behavioral level, the mechanism behind understanding human
pointing might differ between humans and dogs (see, e.g., Topál,
Gergely, Erdo˝hegyi, Csibra, & Miklósi, 2009, for a similar con-
clusion in the A-not-B paradigm). Although this location bias
could also be interpreted as misunderstanding the pointing gesture,
it should be noted that pointing can have more than one valid
meaning (see, e.g., Kovács et al., 2014). For dogs, the pointing
gesture might indicate a relevant location or direction, whereas for
humans pointing can convey information about an object’s prop-
erties (Kaminski, 2009). From this perspective, our results suggest
a crucial difference in the default “meaning” of ostensive pointing
for dogs and humans. This discrepancy, however, most probably
reflects differences in the cognitive mechanisms of the two spe-
cies, despite a possible functional analogy in behavior.
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